Analysis: A very interesting Tennessee Court of Appeals
decision was recently decided on an issue that often comes up in sexual abuse cases. The question is whether a national
organization or entity can be held responsible for actions that occurred by the
local organization or their members or volunteers. The Tennessee Court of Appeals decision of Ms. B., individually
and on behalf of minor child, John Doe, “N” v. Boys and Girls Club of Middle
Tennessee, et al, No. M-2013-00812-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 890892 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2014) involved a lawsuit that was filed for the alleged sexual abuse of
a minor child by a volunteer associated with the local Boys and Girls Club of Middle Tennessee. The national entity, Boys and Girls Club of America,
was also sued in this case. The trial
court granted the national entity’s motion for summary judgment and that ruling
was appealed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
The question before the Tennessee Court of
Appeals was whether the national Boys and Girls Club of America had a legal
responsibility to the minor child in this context. The court noted that it is well settled in
Tennessee that “there is no duty to protect others against risks of harm by
third parties.” Ms. B. at 4. However, the court went on to state that, “an
exception arises, however, when a special relationship exists between the
defendant and either the person at risk or the actor who is the source of the
risk or danger.” Ms. B. at 4. Further, “[i]f an individual stands in a special
relationship to another individual
who is the source of the danger or who is foreseeably at risk from the danger,
then the individual
assumes an affirmative duty to exercise reasonable care to either control the
danger or protect the vulnerable.” Ms. B. at 4.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals in this
case framed the specific issue in dispute as follows:
The question of
whether a duty should be imposed on BBBSA to take reasonable measures to
prevent sexual abuse of children participating in programs offered by BBBSMT,
its affiliate in Middle Tennessee, turns on whether BBBSA
possesses the means and ability to control the affiliate's operations.” Ms. B. at 6.
The Court therefore conducted a fact
specific inquiry to determine the extent of the “means and ability” to control
the local organization. The agreement
between the national entity and the local entity stated that the national
entity “does not control the day-to-day operations and affairs of” the local
entity. The national entity also
asserted it had no “operational control” over how the Tennessee entity
implemented their programs. Ms. B. at 4. The Tennessee Court of Appeals, however,
found that the parameters of the agreement between the national entity and the
local entity were not dispositive as to whether the national entity could
potentially be held responsible for the sexual abuse of a minor in this
context. Ms. B.
at 6.
Despite the fact that certain language in
the agreements provides the local entity is subject to local control and not
subject to the operational control of the national entity, there were other
documents that made it clear the national entity exerted a significant amount
of control. The Court noted “read
together in their entirety, the Agreement and Standards state that BBBSA will
not control or administer affiliate programs, and then sets out, to a large
extent, the manner in which the affiliates must operate and the practices which
they are required to follow.” Ms. B. at 7. Although there is broad sweeping language
about the independence of the local entity, the document also provides a lot of
specific requirements for the local entity that imply a much greater level of
ability to control.
Ultimately, the Tennessee Court of Appeals
found as follows in the key paragraph in the opinion:
The strong public
policy of preventing sexual child abuse unambiguously expressed by our General
Assembly, coupled with the foreseeability and gravity of harm, weigh heavily in
favor of imposing a duty of care on BBBSA to supervise its affiliates so as to
protect against sexual child abuse. As noted above, however, the duty to
control the conduct of a third-party, in this case, BBBSMT, does not arise in
the absence of “the means and ability to control the third party.” Id.
(quoting Newton v. Tinsley, 970 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)).
Regardless of the extent to which BBBSA chooses to exercise any right or
ability to control its affiliates, BBBSA has failed to carry its burden in this
case to affirmatively demonstrate that it did not possess the means and ability
to control the acts of BBBSMT for the purposes of affirmatively negating
Mother's claims of negligent supervision and screening of Mr. Arnold; negligent
failure to monitor N; negligent failure to ensure a safe environment; and
negligence in the failure to ensure that the match specialist assigned to N was
complying with organizational policy and procedures.
As a result, just because a national
entity attempts to draft contracts, standards, and agreements with local
entities that disavow any “control”, “operational authority” or “liability” for
any actions of the local entity, does not mean this will be upheld by the
courts. Many national organizations want
to claim independence from the local entities so they cannot be sued when
things go wrong, however, the national organizations do not, in fact, act like
the local entities are truly independent.
This is true for religious organizations as well as non-religious
organizations. Obviously, every
situation is different and involves a fact specific assessment that needs to be
completed in each case, however, this case makes clear that a national entity
cannot simply disavow by agreement their potential responsibility to monitor a
local entity’s activity. It is of note
that this case specifically dealt with child sexual abuse allegations but I
could certainly see this legal theory expanded to other types of cases in the
future (for instance non-sexual abuse violence).
Follow me on Twitter at @jasonalee for updates from the Tennessee Defense Litigation
blog.
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