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Posted on Feb 7 2018 6:42PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Tennessee sexual
harassment cases that are brought against an employer are governed by the
Tennessee Human Rights Act. The underlying basis for claims against an employer
for sexual harassment fall under the provision in T.C.A.
§ 4-21-401 that provides that it is a discriminatory practice for an employer
to “fail or refuse to hire or discharge any person or otherwise to discriminate
against an individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, creed, color, religion,
sex, age or national origin…”. Sexual
harassment cases fall within this section and I have previously discussed the Tennessee
law standard for a sexual harassment case in my prior blog post here.
It is important to
note that there are specific caps on damages for Tennessee sexual harassment
claims (as well as other discriminatory causes of action brought against
employers under the Tennessee Human Rights Act). Specifically, this statute
provides the following in T.C.A.
§ 4-21-313:
(a) For any cause of action arising under § 4-21-401, § 8-50-103, or §
50-1-304, the sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded for future
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, shall not exceed, for
each complaining party:
(1) In the case of a cause of action arising under § 50-1-304 and an
employer who has less than eight (8) employees at the time the cause of action
arose, twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000);
(2) In the case of an employer who has eight (8) or more but fewer than
fifteen (15) employees at the time the cause of action arose, twenty-five
thousand dollars ($25,000);
(3) In the case of an employer who has more than fourteen (14) and fewer
than one hundred one (101) employees at the time the cause of action arose,
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000);
(4) In the case of an employer who has more than one hundred (100) and
fewer than two hundred one (201) employees at the time the cause of action
arose, one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000);
(5) In the case of an employer who has more than two hundred (200) and
fewer than five hundred one (501) employees at the time the cause of action
arose, two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000); and
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Posted on Dec 12 2017 4:04PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Tennessee has the
tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress which is an important cause
of action that allows a plaintiff to recover damages when the conduct of the
defendant is outrageous. There are very
specific requirements for a plaintiff to be able to prove this cause of action
in court. In order to support a claim
for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, the Tennessee Supreme Court
has held that the following elements are required:
The elements of an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim are that the defendant's
conduct was (1) intentional or reckless, (2) so outrageous that it is not
tolerated by civilized society, and (3) resulted in serious mental injury to
the plaintiff. Regarding the first element, the law is clear in Tennessee and
elsewhere that either intentional or reckless conduct on the part of the defendant
will suffice to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Rogers v. Louisville
Land Company et al, 367 S.W.3d 196, 205 (Tenn. 2012). The Rogers case is
a very important Tennessee Supreme Court case that definitively outlined the
requirements for this cause of action. In
this case the court made it very clear that there is no difference between a
claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and the claim for Reckless
Infliction of Emotional Distress. Both are considered part of the same cause of
action (either intentional or reckless conduct is sufficient to meet the
threshold required for this cause of action).
Further, the familiar standard of “outrageous”
conduct that has long been required for an Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
claim still stands. Specifically, that the conduct must be “so outrageous that it is not tolerated by
civilized society”. Obviously, this is
generally a jury issue however courts have long stepped in to evaluate whether
the facts of a case meet this threshold before sending the case to the jury. This standard is a standard that can change
over time because it is based on what is tolerated by “civilized society”. For example, it is my view that certain types
of sexual harassment and sexually hostile work environment situations are
currently experiencing a shift in what is tolerated by “civilized” society.
Importantly, our country is making significant progress on what it considers to
be outrageous conduct by individuals who sexually harass women. It is my position, therefore, that this
standard has changed over time and what may not have been considered outrageous
conduct in the 1980s certainly is outrageous conduct today.
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Posted on Nov 17 2017 1:19PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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The
Tennessee Supreme Court issued a very important decision today on the appeal in
the Dedmon case. Many people have
been waiting on this decision from the plaintiff’s side and the defendant’s
side. The Dedmon case was the case
where the Tennessee Court of Appeals ruled that defendants, in personal injury
cases, could introduce evidence of the discounted amounts accepted by health providers
or paid by insurance companies. I
previously blogged on this
prior ruling here.
The
Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the key part of the prior Tennessee Court of
Appeals decision today. The key part in
the new case (and a good summary of the current status of the law on this
issue) is the following:
In sum, we hold that
the definition of “reasonable charges” under the Hospital Lien Act set forth in
West v.
Shelby County Healthcare Corp., 459 S.W.3d 33 (Tenn. 2014), does not apply
directly to determinations of “reasonable medical expenses” in personal injury
cases; the West definition of “reasonable charges” is limited in application to
interpretation of the Hospital Lien Act. We also decline to alter existing law
in Tennessee regarding the collateral source rule. Consequently, the Plaintiffs
may submit evidence of Mrs. Dedmon’s full, undiscounted medical bills as proof
of her “reasonable medical expenses,” and the Defendants are precluded from submitting
evidence of discounted rates for medical services accepted by medical providers
as a result of Mrs. Dedmon’s insurance.
The Defendants remain free to submit any other competent evidence to rebut the
Plaintiffs’ proof on the reasonableness of Mrs. Dedmon’s medical expenses, so
long as the Defendants’ proof does not contravene the collateral source
rule. Thus, we affirm the Court of
Appeals’ decision to reverse the trial court’s grant of the Defendants’ motion
in limine, but we reverse the Court of Appeals to the extent that it held that
the Defendants could introduce evidence of lesser amounts accepted by Mrs.
Dedmon’s medical providers in order to rebut the Plaintiffs’ proof on
reasonableness.
As
a result, this basically returns the status of the law on this issue in
Tennessee to the prior status quo. Usually,
the only evidence that a jury will now hear about the medical bills in a case
is the amount of the medical bills charged by the medical care provider. This effectively greatly inflates (in many
situations) the amount of “medical bills” for an injury. However, this is the law in Tennessee. I expect this will not be the end of this
issue and the Tennessee Legislature will take a look at trying to find a
solution in the coming years.
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Posted on Oct 12 2017 11:16AM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Equal Pay Act claims
in Tennessee are essentially claims usually involve situations where a female
employee is paid less than a male employee for the same job. These claims can be brought in Tennessee
under the Tennessee Equal Pay Act (found in T.C.A.
§ 50-2-201 et al) and under the Federal Equal Pay Act (found in 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)). These statutes basically are very similar to
each other. These types of pay disparity
claims can also be brought under Title VII for sex discrimination.
Initial Burden of the Plaintiff:
To establish a prima
facie claim of unequal pay for equal work under the EPA, a plaintiff has the
burden to prove that the employer “pays different wages to employees of
opposite sexes for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions.” Vehar
v. Cole Nat'l Group, Inc., 251 Fed.Appx. 993, 998 (6th Cir. 2007). Essentially, a female employee meets this
burden if she proves that she is paid less than a male employee performing the
same job (does not need to be perfectly identical but does need to be
substantially similar) at the employer.
Defenses Available to Employer:
After this initial
burden is met by the employee, then the employer has some available defenses to
try to combat a finding of liability under the EPA. Specifically, once a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case of disparate pay, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove
the wage differential is justified under one of four affirmative defenses: “(1)
a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (4) any other factor other than sex.” Buntin
v. Breathitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 134 F.3d 796, 799 (6th Cir.1998).
I...
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Posted on Apr 30 2017 1:56PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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The Tennessee Court of
Appeals in Richard Lane, et al v. Estate of Gary K. Leggett, No.
M2016-00448-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 1176982 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) discussed whether a Plaintiff can recover for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress for a claim that involves only property damage. In this
case, the Plaintiff owned a business in White House, Tennessee. The Defendant
rear-ended a vehicle and left the roadway at a high rate of speed, causing his
car to run into the building that contained the Plaintiff’s business. The
vehicle struck a gas meter which resulted in a significant fire and caused a
complete loss of the Plaintiff’s business. The Plaintiff was not actually at
the property at the time of the loss, but he returned shortly thereafter and
witnessed the fire at his business.
As a result of this
accident, the Plaintiff filed suit asserting that the loss of Plaintiff’s
business and the great fire that was caused by the accident, as well as
Plaintiff’s observations, caused him to have severe mental and emotional
injuries. He was even diagnosed with
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Anxiety from the incident. Plaintiff
therefore claimed he was entitled to recover against the Defendant under the
theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress for these personal
injuries.
The Tennessee Court of
Appeals noted that to recover damages under the theory of negligent infliction
of emotional distress, a plaintiff must “prove each of the elements of general
negligence; duty, breach of duty, injury or loss, causation and fact, and
proximate, or legal, cause. A plaintiff must also prove that he or she has
suffered a serious or severe emotional injury” (Lane at p. 3) (citing Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d
437 (Tenn. 1996). Interestingly, however, no case in Tennessee has
explicitly held that negligent infliction of emotional distress is an
appropriate claim for a plaintiff resulting from emotional injuries that solely
arise out of property damage.
The Court reviewed
Tennessee Supreme Court cases and found one case that commented on this issue,
but did not have a holding on this issue directly. In that case, Whaley v. Perkins, 197 S.W.3d 665, 670 (Tenn. 2006), the Tennessee Supreme Court stated the followin...
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Posted on Jul 4 2016 3:54PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Tennessee law is clear
that any person, firm or corporation who misrepresents that they are a licensed
contractor is subject to significant penalties. It is also against Tennessee law to act in the
capacity of a “contractor” in Tennessee when one is not properly licensed. Specifically, T.C.A.
§ 62-6-136 discusses this issue in subsection (A) as follows:
(a) It is unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to represent
itself as a licensed contractor or to act in the capacity of a “contractor” as
defined in §§
62-6-102, or 62-37-103, and related rules and regulations of this state, or
any similar statutes, rules and regulations of another state, while not
licensed, unless such person, firm or corporation has been duly licensed under §
62-6-103 or § 62-37-104.
A licensed contractor
is specifically defined in this statute.
This is a rather lengthy statute, but the key part is the provision that
licensure is required for projects beyond $25,000.00. The complete definition is found in T.C.A.
§ 62-6-102 which defines a contractor as follows:
(4)(A)(i) “Contractor” means any person or entity that
undertakes to, attempts to or submits a price or bid or offers to construct,
supervise, superintend, oversee, schedule, direct or in any manner assume
charge of the construction, alteration, repair, improvement, movement,
demolition, putting up, tearing down or furnishing labor to install material or
equipment for any building, highway, road, railroad, sewer, grading,
excavation, pipeline, public utility structure, project development, housing,
housing development, improvement or any other construction undertaking for
which the total cost is twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or more;
provided, however, with respect to a licensed masonry contractor, such term
means and includes the masonry portion of the construction project, the total
cost of which exceeds one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), materials and
labor;
(ii) “Contractor” includes, but is not limited to, a
prime contractor, electrical contractor, electrical subcontractor, mechanical
contractor, mechanical subcontractor, plumbing contractor and plumbing
subcontractor, masonry contractor, and roofing subcontractor where the total
cost of the roofing portion of the construction project is twenty-five thousand
dollars ($25,000) or more;
(iii...
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Posted on Jun 7 2016 3:21PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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A very important
Tennessee Court of Appeals opinion was issued on June 2, 2016. In this case, Jean Dedmon v. Debbie Steelman, No. W2015-01462-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App.
June 2, 2016), the Court discussed whether the amount an insurance
company actually pays for medical services in a personal injury action, is, as
a matter of law, the “reasonable” amount of medical expenses. In order to recover medical expenses under
Tennessee law, in a personal injury action, the plaintiff must prove the
medical expenses were reasonable and necessary.
The reason the Dedmon decision is so important is because of the West v. Shelby County Healthcare Corp., 459 S.W.3d 33 (Tenn. 2014) decision. In the West
case, the Tennessee Supreme Court, when interpreting the Tennessee Hospital
Lien Act, essentially found that a hospital’s non-discounted charges reflected
in their lien, were not reasonable because they do not reflect what is actually
being paid in the marketplace. The Court
found that, under the Tennessee Hospital Lien Act, the amount actually paid for
the hospital charges were the reasonable charges for the services provided, not
the amounts billed which were, as a matter of law, unreasonable.
Since the time of the West decision, several trial courts and some Federal
district courts have decided that the West case reasoning also applies to personal injury
actions. They have found that essentially,
in a personal injury action in the State of Tennessee, evidence of the actual
amount actually paid for medical bills is the only amount that can be
introduced into evidence, not the amount billed or charged by the
provider. The reason is, due to
insurance industry dynamics, there is almost always a significant difference in
the amount billed or charged by the provider and the amount actually paid by
insurance, Medicare or otherwise. For
instance, in the Dedmon case, the total amount of “incurred” medical expenses
were $52,482.87 (the amount charged by the providers). However, the plaintiff’s health insurance
carrier only paid $18,255.42. As a
result, there is a significant disparity between the amount billed and the
amount actually paid.
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Posted on Apr 17 2016 3:49PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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A recent case dealt
with an attempted amendment to add personal injury damages after the initial
suit only requested property damages.
The case was State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Robert Blondin, No.
M2014-01756-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 1019609 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). This case was about a July 7, 2009 automobile
accident that occurred where an individual sustained personal injury and
property damages. State Farm Insurance
filed a Civil Warrant on May 17, 2010 to recover amounts paid to their own insured
under the uninsured motorist provision of their policy. State Farm sued the allegedly at fault driver
for property damage only as outlined in their initial Civil Warrant. On July 15, 2010, after the 1 year statute of
limitations for personal injury, State Farm filed a motion to amend the Civil
Warrant to assert personal injury damages as well. The General Sessions Court denied the motion
due to the fact the statute of limitations had expired. State Farm then appealed to the Circuit Court
where this request was also denied and then the case was set for trial. State Farm next voluntarily dismissed the
case without prejudice prior to trial.
After the dismissal
without prejudice, State Farm refiled the action in General Sessions Court on
January 31, 2012. This time, State Farm’s
Civil Warrant was for personal injury and property damages. Ultimately, the Circuit Court, on appeal from
General Sessions Court, went forward with the trial and allowed the case to be
tried seeking both personal injury and property damages. The Court awarded personal injury and
property damages at the trial. This case
was then appealed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals over the statute of
limitations issue.
The Tennessee Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial Circuit Court. The Court found that “the statute of
limitations operated to deprive the General Sessions Court of subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the claim for personal injuries”. State
Farm at p. 3. Further, the appeals
and voluntary dismissal by State Farm did not operate to revive or extend the statute
of limitations because the statute of limitations was already extinguished. State
Farm at p. 3. The Court also
discussed State Farm’s argument that the saving statute under T.C.A.
§ 28-1-105 somehow permitted State Farm to re-file the previous action and
rely upon the prior filing of the lawsuit to extend statute of limitation. The Court noted that the saving statute did
permit State Farm to re-file the cause of action but it did not resurrect the
previously barred cause of...
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Posted on Nov 28 2015 12:03PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Sometimes juries make interesting decisions
that need to be sorted out by the Tennessee Appellate Courts. The recent case of Khadijeh
Naraghian v. Darryle K. Wilson, No. W2014-02002-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 7012526
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) dealt with an automobile accident that occurred
in Shelby County Tennessee. In this
case, the plaintiff alleged the defendant struck the plaintiff’s vehicle in the
rear causing a neck injury to the plaintiff due to the accident. Liability for the accident was disputed based
upon the theory
of alleged comparative fault of the plaintiff. Regardless, there were approximately
$13,440.00 of medical bills that were not contested by the defendant by any
substantive counter medical proof.
Ultimately, the jury found in favor of the
plaintiff and awarded a total of $7,831.67.
The jury also found the plaintiff was 44.58% at fault for the accident
and therefore the trial court reduced the award to $4,340.31. The question on appeal was whether the jury
award was disproportionate to the amount of damages actually proved at trial.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals found the
award was not appropriate based on the evidence and therefore the award of
damages was reversed. The Court noted
that it was basically undisputed that the plaintiff incurred approximately
$13,440.00 in medical expenses. The plaintiff
asserted the jury cannot simply arbitrarily disallow part of the medical expenses
that were incurred as a result of the injury.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals agreed.
The Court found the following:
As we have already
stressed, there was no evidence in this case rebutting the necessity or
reasonableness of the charges billed by Dr. Burford. His testimony was
essentially unimpeached. Because we cannot reconcile the jury's verdict with
the undisputed evidence that was presented, we must vacate the trial court's
judgment and remand this matter for a new trial.
Id.
at 5.
This case is certainly interesting because
it shows that a jury cannot disregard competent uncont...
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Posted on Oct 19 2015 9:42AM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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I previously discussed major trends in
Tennessee verdicts and the conservative or liberal nature of many counties
in Tennessee for verdicts in personal injury cases. This post is designed to provide updated
statistics on the most recent data available so you have the best information covering
the last five years. This information
can provide valuable insight on the risks associated with taking a case to
trial in the various Tennessee jurisdictions.
The statistics contained in the below chart
are for the 5 year period covering July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2014 (based on
the most recent Tennessee
judiciary reports currently available). These numbers include both jury and non-jury cases (because the statistics available do not separate them out).
I will list the counties in order with the most conservative at the
beginning of the list and the most liberal at the bottom of the list (when I
use the terms “conservative” and “liberal” I am simply referring to the
percentages of cases where damages were actually awarded).
District
and County
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Cases
Tried
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Cases
Awarded Damages
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Percentage
of cases awarded damages
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District 27 (Obion, Weakley)
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7
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0
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0
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District 28 (Crockett, Gibson, Haywood)
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4
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0
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0
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District 29 (Dyer, Lake)
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10
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0
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0
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District 25 (Fayette, Hardeman,
Lauderdale, McNairy, Tipton)
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36
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1
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2.8
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District 17 (Bedford, Lincoln, Marshall,
Moore)
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35
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1
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2.9
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District 23 (Cheatham, Dickson, Houston,
Humphreys, Stewart)
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16
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1
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6.3
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District 8 (Campbell,
Claiborne, Fentress, Scott, Union)
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131
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14
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10.7
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District 15 (Jackson, Macon, Smith,
Trousdale, Wilson)
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39
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6
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15.4
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District 12 (Bledsoe, Franklin, Grundy,
Marion, Rhea, Sequatchie)
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50
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10
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20.0
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District 24 (Benton, Carroll, Decatur,
Hardin, Henry)
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30
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6
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20.0
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District 10 (Bradley, McMinn, Monroe,
Polk)
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99
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22
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22.2
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District 13 (Clay, Cumberland, Dekalb, Overton, Pickett,
Putnam, White)
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96
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23
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24.0
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District 4 (Cocke, Grainger, Jefferson
Sevier)
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66
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19
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28.8
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District 16 (Cannon, Rutherford)
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116
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34
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29.3
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District 2 (Sullivan)
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28
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9
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32.1
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District 3 (Greene, Hamblen, Hancock,
Hawkins)
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31
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10
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32.3
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District 21 (Hickman, Lewis, Perry,
Williamson)
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37
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12
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32.4
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District 1 (Carter, Johnson, Unicoi, Washington)
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49
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16
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32.7
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District 11 (Hamilton)
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191
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66
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34.6
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District 5 (Blount)
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31
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11
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35.5
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District 6 (Knox)
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256
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94
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36.7
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District 18 (Sumner)
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60
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23
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38.3
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District 31 (Van Buren, Warren)
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10
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4
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40.0
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District 22 (Giles, Lawrence, Maury, Wayne)
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24
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10
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41.7
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District 9 (Loudon, Meigs, Morgan, Roane)
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32
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15
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46.8
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District 26 (Chester,
Henderson, Madison)
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82
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39
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47.6
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District 19 (Montgomery, Robertson)
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77
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39
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50.6
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District 7 (Anderson)
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71
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36
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50.7
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District 30 (Shelby)
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415
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211
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50.8
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District 20 (Davidson)
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313
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185
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59.1
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District 14 (Coffee)
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19
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14
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73.7
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Generally, most
Tennessee counties are conservative when it comes to assessing damages in
personal injury or death cases. Overall,
there were 2471 cases tried in Tennessee during this 5 year period. A total of 931 resulted in monetary
damages. This means only 37.7% of
personal injury cases that went to trial in Tennessee actually resulted in
monetary damages over the last five years.
Also, remember that some cases go to trial where there is a stipulation
or concession of liability and the only issue is the extent of monetary
damages. As a result, the actual
percentage of cases where damages are awarded are probably significantly lower
than the above statistics because of this factor that cannot be determined by
the statistics.
The above information
can provide valuable insight to attorneys, corporations and insurance companies
on the general proclivities of certain Tennessee jurisdictions in personal
injury cases. The two most liberal
jurisdictions (setting aside Coffee County which has a very small sample size)
are Davidson County and Shelby County, as would be expected. However, even in those counties, it is close
to a 50/50 proposition on whether damages will be awarded or not. When compared to my prior statistical
report that was done covering a 7 year period from 2005 to 2012, it is
clear most Tennessee jurisdictions have become more reluctant to award damages
in personal injury or death cases.
Follow me on Twitter at @jasonalee for updates from the Tennessee Defense Litigation
blog.
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