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Posted on Jun 25 2017 2:42PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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The Tennessee Supreme
Court recently issued an interesting opinion in a case involving a fire which
caused a loss to a partially completed house. In this case, Ewin B.
Jenkins v. Big City Remodeling, et al, No. E2014-01612-SC-R11-CV, 515 S.W.3d
843 (Tenn. 2017), the Court dealt with a situation where the Plaintiff’s
hired a general contractor to construct a house. The general contractor subcontracted
the hardwood flooring work to another contractor, which in turn subcontracted the
job to another subcontractor. On October 31, 2012, the partially completed
house and everything in the house were destroyed by a fire. The legal theory used
by the plaintiffs against the general contractor was the theory of res ipsa loquituur
to try to establish an inference of negligence on the general contractor.
The Tennessee Supreme
Court noted that due to the fact the Plaintiffs lacked direct proof of the general
contractor’s negligence, they relied upon the evidentiary principle of res ipsa
loquitor to establish an inference of negligence. The phrase “res ipsa
loquitur” is a Latin phrase meaning “the thing speaks for itself”. The classic
case where the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was first referenced is a 19th
Century English case, Byrne
v. Boadle, 159
Eng. Rep. 299 (1863). In that case, a barrel of flour rolled out
of a window of a warehouse and fell on a passing pedestrian. The pedestrian
could not point to any specific negligent actions on behalf of the warehouse
owner that actually caused the barrel of flour to hit the pedestrian. However, the plaintiff successfully argued
that this was the kind of event that would not happen without the negligence of
the warehouse owner. As a result, the plaintiff in that case was successful
under this theory.
In the Jenkins
case at issue, the Tennessee Supreme Court analyzed the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine in detail. In order to establish res ipsa loquitur in Tennessee, a
plaintiff must show that “(a) the event that caused the injury is of a kind
that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other
responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons,
are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and (c) the negligence is within
the scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.” Jenkins
at 849. The Tennessee Supreme Court noted that res ipsa loquitur has been
applied in fire loss cases in Tennessee and in other jurisdictions when the
exact cause of the fire is not known. However, in those cases, the defendant
had “exclusive control over the premises or the instrumentality that cause the
fire.” Jenkins
at 849. That is the key issue in the Jenkins case.
In the Jenkins
case, the Court found the Plaintiff simply did not...
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Posted on Apr 30 2017 1:56PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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The Tennessee Court of
Appeals in Richard Lane, et al v. Estate of Gary K. Leggett, No.
M2016-00448-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 1176982 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) discussed whether a Plaintiff can recover for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress for a claim that involves only property damage. In this
case, the Plaintiff owned a business in White House, Tennessee. The Defendant
rear-ended a vehicle and left the roadway at a high rate of speed, causing his
car to run into the building that contained the Plaintiff’s business. The
vehicle struck a gas meter which resulted in a significant fire and caused a
complete loss of the Plaintiff’s business. The Plaintiff was not actually at
the property at the time of the loss, but he returned shortly thereafter and
witnessed the fire at his business.
As a result of this
accident, the Plaintiff filed suit asserting that the loss of Plaintiff’s
business and the great fire that was caused by the accident, as well as
Plaintiff’s observations, caused him to have severe mental and emotional
injuries. He was even diagnosed with
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Anxiety from the incident. Plaintiff
therefore claimed he was entitled to recover against the Defendant under the
theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress for these personal
injuries.
The Tennessee Court of
Appeals noted that to recover damages under the theory of negligent infliction
of emotional distress, a plaintiff must “prove each of the elements of general
negligence; duty, breach of duty, injury or loss, causation and fact, and
proximate, or legal, cause. A plaintiff must also prove that he or she has
suffered a serious or severe emotional injury” (Lane at p. 3) (citing Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d
437 (Tenn. 1996). Interestingly, however, no case in Tennessee has
explicitly held that negligent infliction of emotional distress is an
appropriate claim for a plaintiff resulting from emotional injuries that solely
arise out of property damage.
The Court reviewed
Tennessee Supreme Court cases and found one case that commented on this issue,
but did not have a holding on this issue directly. In that case, Whaley v. Perkins, 197 S.W.3d 665, 670 (Tenn. 2006), the Tennessee Supreme Court stated the followin...
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Posted on Apr 2 2017 4:43PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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A recent Tennessee
Court of Appeals decision, Joe
Patton Rogers v. Bradley Dean Hadju, No. W2016-00850-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 1077059
(Tenn.Ct.App. 2017) discussed whether a contractor can be held
responsible for the actions of their subcontractor. In this case, there were multiple contracts between
several entities for a construction project where multiple contractors subcontracted
out work. Ultimately, the Plaintiff was
involved in an automobile accident that caused serious injuries to the
Plaintiff. The question, therefore, was
whether a contractor can be held responsible for the actions of its
subcontractor (both were sued for the accident in question).
The general law in
Tennessee is that “where one person has sustained an injury from the negligence
of another, he must, in general, proceed against him by whose negligence the
injury was occasioned.” Rogers
at 3. Further, “while an employer
may be held liable for the negligence of its employee, however, they are
generally not liable for the negligence of independent contractors.” Rogers at 3 (citing Givens v.
Mullikin, 75 S.W.3d 383, 384 (Tenn. 2012)). The Court then discussed how people or
entities are classified as either employees or independent contractors. Generally, the relationship can be determined
by examining the agreement between parties.
The Court went on to discuss this issue as follows:
In determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor, Tennessee courts are guided by the following factors: (1) the right
to control the conduct of the work, (2) the right of termination, (3) method of
payment, (4) whether or not the worker furnishes his own helpers, (5) whether
or not the worker furnishes his own tools, (6) self-scheduling of working
hours, and (7) freedom to render services to other entities. Goodale v. Langenberg,
243 S.W.3d 575, 582-83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Those factors, however,
are not absolute, and no single factor is conclusive. While the “right to control” is the primary
test, it is not exclusive, and the entire relationship must be examined.
Rogers at 3. As a result, the essence of determining
whether an entity is an “employee” or an “independent contractor” is the
element of control. The Court noted that
the “mere fact that the contractor reserves the right to supervise the work to
ensure that the end result conforms to the plans does not make this
subcontractor an employee when the contractor doe...
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Posted on Jan 25 2015 12:46PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Another good Tennessee Court of Appeals premises
liability decision was recently published.
The case is Elizabeth
F. Holland v. K-VA-T Food Stores, Inc., No. E2013-02798-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL
151373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015). In
this case the plaintiff visited a Food City store in Sevier County Tennessee. The property was divided by a continuous curb
which was unmarked. The court noted that
the curb was there to prevent cars parked at Food City from traveling into the
drive-thru area of the adjacent bank.
The plaintiff’s husband parked perpendicular to the curb. After returning from shopping the plaintiff
loaded her car with groceries. She then
stepped backwards, tripped on the curb and fell to the ground, sustaining injuries.
The plaintiff filed a negligence cause of
action against Food City and other defendants and sought $350,000.00. The trial court granted summary judgment and
found the defendant had no duty to warn the plaintiff of the curb and that if
the case was presented to a jury, the jury could not reasonably conclude that
the plaintiff was less than 50% at fault for her injuries. The case was then appealed.
On appeal, the plaintiff tried to argue that
the summary judgment was error because the defendant never established that she
failed to look where she was walking.
The court noted, however, that the plaintiff admitted she was walking
backwards, that the curb was visible and that she would have noticed it had she
been looking for it or if she paid attention to it. The plaintiff did not admit that she failed
to look behind her while walking – but this was not enough.
The court stated that the curb was not a “random,
superfluous curb in the way of travel between grocery patrons and the trip to
and from the establishment. The curb operated as a visible and physical barrier
between the Food
City parking lot and the Bank, namely the drive-through area of the Bank.” Holland at
3. The court then affirmed summary
judgment and found that “defendant did not have a duty to warn plaintiff of the
curb and because plaintiff’s mode of travel, namely walking backward, was the
cause of her injury.”
As a result, this case combined with other
Tennessee premises liability cases, make it clear that it is very difficult to
win a case involving a plaintiff who trips over a curb.
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Posted on Jan 28 2014 9:28AM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Analysis: The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently dealt
with the question of the responsibility of an individual who becomes unconscious,
while driving, causing an automobile accident.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals in George Smith v.
General Tire and Emily Alexander, No. M2012-01446-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 2395047 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2013)
involved a case where a man was injured in a head-on collision. The unconscious defendant in this case testified she did not remember
anything on the day of the accident from the point she came to a red light on
Gallatin Road until she woke up in an ambulance on the way to the
hospital. She had a long history of diabetes
but she had never experienced a loss of consciousness prior to the accident in
question. Additionally, she had never
been advised by her physician that she should not drive a vehicle. Her treating physician testified her blood
sugar level must have dropped too quickly for her to realize before she became
unconscious.
There was medical testimony submitted by
both sides pertaining to the possibility of her becoming unconscious based on the
medication and diagnosis of the defendant.
The Smith court found that
the Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted a rule that embodies how to deal with evaluating
the situation where a driver suddenly loses consciousness. This rule is as follows:
A sudden loss of
consciousness or physical capacity experienced while driving which is not
reasonably foreseeable is a defense to a negligence action. To constitute a
defense, defendant must establish that the sudden loss of consciousness or
physical capacity to control the vehicle was not reasonably foreseeable to a
prudent person. As a result, the defense is not avail...
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Posted on Dec 2 2013 9:56AM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Analysis: Over eight years ago the Tennessee Supreme
Court handed down the decision of West v. East
Tennessee Pioneer Oil Co., 172 S.W.3rd 545 (Tenn. 2005). This case set new precedent at that time and
it is a good case to review because of the impact it can have on many negligence
situations. It primarily discussed and
considered the foreseeability element in a negligence case.
In West, an individual who
had been drinking alcohol on the night in question purchased gas from a
convenience store gas station. There
were some disputed facts, however, it was plaintiff's contention that this
individual was clearly intoxicated and the convenience store employees knew he
was intoxicated when they sold him gas.
Additionally, an off-duty employee of the store actually assisted the
intoxicated individual by pushing the correct buttons on the gas pump in order
to activate the pump. There was a
dispute about whether all of these individuals knew the allegedly intoxicated
individual was in fact intoxicated and whether or not he was the actual driver
of the vehicle. After the vehicle left
the gas station, it struck another vehicle, causing severe injuries to the
plaintiffs.
The trial court dismissed the cause of
action against the gas station. The
trial court basically found that under Tennessee law, the plaintiffs could not
hold the convenience store liable under these circumstances. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court
reversed this decision and found that:
we conclude that a
convenience store employee owes a duty of reasonable care to persons on the
roadways, including the plaintiffs, not to sell gasoline to a person whom the
employee knows (or reasonably ought to know) to be intoxicated and to be the
driver of the motor vehicle. Similarly, a convenience store employee also owes
a duty of reasonable care not to assist in providing gasoline (in this case
pumping the gasoline) to a person whom the employee knows (or reasonably ought
to know) to be intoxicated and to be the driver of the motor vehicle. We stress
that because [f]oreseeability is the test of negligence...
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Posted on Nov 3 2013 4:25PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Analysis: I was recently asked
what Tennessee statutes govern whether horses are allowed on roadways and what “rules
of the road” would apply to horses or other animal drawn vehicles. Tennessee has a statute that cover this issue. T.C.A.
§ 55-8-105 provides that animals and animal drawn vehicles on the roadway
are basically subject to the same laws as all other vehicles on the road. They are granted the same rights as well as
the same duties that are provided to motor vehicles under Tennessee law.
T.C.A.
§ 55-8-105 provides as follows:
Every person
riding an animal or driving any animal-drawn vehicle upon a roadway shall be
granted all of the rights and shall be subject to all of the duties applicable
to the driver of a vehicle by this chapter and chapter 10, parts 1-5 of this
title, except those provisions of this chapter and chapter 10, parts 1-5 of
this title that by their very nature can have no application.
The only exception
listed in this statute where the rules of the road and duties applicable to
drivers of motor vehicles do not apply are where the statute by its very nature
could have no application. For example,
if there are specific statutes that discuss braking requirements or turn signals,
those would not apply to someone who is riding a horse under T.C.A.
§ 55-8-105.
Follow me on Twitter at @jasonalee
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Posted on Sep 30 2013 7:33AM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Brief
Summary: Tennessee emergency responders are not
required to follow certain traffic laws when responding to an emergency
call. However, they are still required
to drive with “due regard for the safety of all persons” and can still be held
liable if they do not comply with this requirement.
Analysis: A recent Tennessee Court of Appeals decision
discussed an interesting issue about whether emergency responders are required
to comply with traffic laws. The case of
Hardeman County v.
Judy I. McIntyre, 2013 WL 1227034, No. W2012-01690-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App.
2013)
involved a situation where an ambulance struck another vehicle while on an
emergency call. The ambulance crossed
the double lines in order to proceed around some vehicles but ended up striking
the plaintiff’s vehicle, injuring the plaintiff. The trial court assessed 60% of the fault
against the ambulance driver and 40% of the fault against the driver of the
other vehicle. The case was appealed and
the respective duties were discussed in detail.
The court noted that T.C.A. § 55-8-108 provides that
emergency responders are exempt from certain traffic laws in Tennessee. The key parts to T.C.A. § 55-8-108 are as follows:
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Posted on Sep 2 2013 10:22PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Analysis: The Tennessee Court of Appeals in Suzanne Renee
Williams-Ali v. Mountain States Health Alliance, 2013 WL 357580, No.
E2012-00724-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. January 30, 2013) discussed when
a case is a medical malpractice cause of action (now called a “healthcare liability action” under the new statute) as opposed to simply a
negligence claim. Of course, this is of great
importance because of the hoops that one must jump through in order to comply
with the various pre-suit requirements for a Tennessee medical malpractice case. This lawsuit concerned a plaintiff who was
dropped from a table by the defendant’s employees while she was undergoing
myocardial imaging. She essentially fell
off the table and landed on the floor and sustained injuries as a result of the
fall. Williams-Ali
at 1. The plaintiff filed a
lawsuit against the defendant Mountain States Health Alliance under a theory of
negligence, not as a medical malpractice action.
As a result, the defendant filed a motion
to dismiss asserting the causes of action in this matter were actually medical
malpractice as opposed to ordinary negligence and requested dismissal because
the plaintiff did not comply with the medical malpractice pre-suit requirements. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary
judgment to the defendant and found that the gravamen of the complaint sounded
in medical malpractice as opposed to ordinary negligence. The non-compliance with the pre-suit
requirements was therefore fatal to the case.
This case was appealed and the plaintiff asserted that medical training
and experience were not necessary to place or secure a patient onto the scan
table for the nuclear stress test. As a
result, the argument was that this case should be considered a negligence case,
not medical malpractice.
As the Supreme Court has previously held,
“cases involving health or medical entities do not automatically fall within
the medical malpractice statute.” Williams-Ali at 4
(quoting Draper
v. Westerfield, 181 S.W.3d 283, 290 (Tenn. 2005)). The court further noted that a recent Tennessee
Supreme Court provided a lengthy and well-reasoned opinion discussion of the difference
between a medical malpractice claim and an ordinary negligence claim (See Estate
of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546, 555-60 (Tenn. 2011)). In the Estate
of French case the Supreme Court discussed these issues and stated as
follows:
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Posted on Aug 5 2013 8:08AM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Brief
Summary: The short answer is that in Tennessee a
homeowner is generally not responsible for damage caused by their healthy tree that falls onto the property of another and causes damage. The only time the premises owner could be
responsible is if the tree is causing a nuisance or encroaching on the
neighbor’s property.
Analysis: The Tennessee Court of Appeals decided a
recent case on a commonly asked question under Tennessee law. The question is basically whether a homeowner
is responsible if one of their live, healthy trees falls onto their neighbor’s
property and does damage. The Tennessee
Court of Appeals in Cindy Russell v.
Gene Claridy, 2013 WL 655235, No. M2012-01054-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App.
February 20, 2013)
discussed a situation where a live healthy tree fell from the defendant’s
property onto the plaintiff’s property, landing on the plaintiff’s van and
causing damage of approximately $8,810.00.
In this matter the plaintiff had actually contacted the defendant some
years prior regarding concerns about the tree however the defendant did not see
any problems with the tree because it was healthy and basically on pasture
land. As a result, the defendant did not
remove the tree.
The trial court ultimately found the tree
fell due to an “act of God” and therefore the defendant was not liable for
damages to the van. There was no
evidence presented to the court that the tree was unhealthy, was likely to fall
or that the defendant had any notice of any likelihood of the tree falling.
On appeal, the plaintiff asserted this
tree should still be constituted a nuisance because of the threat to the
plaintiff’s property. The court did note
there are other Tennessee decisions which find that encroaching trees onto
another person’s property that “adversely affected the plaintiff’s reasonable
and ordinary use and occupation of her home, not to mention posing hazards to
the plaintiff’s health and safety,” can constitute a nuisance under Tennessee
law. Russell at 3 (citing Lane v. W. J. Curry
and Sons, 92 S.W.3d 355, 363...
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