A recent interesting Tennessee Court of
Appeals decision, Donriel A.
Borne v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc., No. W2013-01949-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL
3778743 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014), discussed the extent a remittitur of a
jury’s award can be allowed. A remittitur
is simply a process where the trial can reduce a jury verdict award in order to
make sure the award is not excessive and is reasonable under Tennessee law. However, a remittitur by the trial court is
not allowed to “destroy” the jury’s actual award. If the jury award is “destroyed” upon a
remittitur (as found by an appellate court), then the verdict is “impermissible
and must be modified or vacated.” Borne at 21.
As a result, the question is, to what
extent can an award be reduced under remittitur principles and not be
“destroyed”? The Borne
decision provided a good analysis of this question. It addressed a recent Tennessee Supreme Court
decision that discussed the “destruction” of an award by remittitur as follows:
The trial court's
authority to suggest a remittitur of a jury's verdict rather than grant a new
trial when it disagrees solely with the award of damages is not absolute. A
suggested remittitur should not be so substantial as to destroy the jury's
verdict. See Foster v. Amcon Int'l, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 142, 148
(Tenn. 1981). There is no set percentage that
represents the destruction of the jury's verdict. See Id. at 148 n. 9 (“[W]e do not
intend to establish a numerical standard for reviewing additurs and
remittiturs.”); Webb v. Canada, No. E2006–01701–COA–R3–CV, 2007 WL
1519536, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2007) (“While we
decline to establish any particular percentage that would indicate a remittitur
that has totally destroyed a jury verdict, we note that [large] remittiturs by
percentage have been found acceptable by this Court and the Supreme Court of
our state.”).
See Meals v. Ford
Motor Co., 417 S.W.3d 414 (Tenn. 2013). The Borne
court noted “no numerical standard has been established by which remittiturs
and additions are reviewed.” Borne at 21. In the Borne case the jury
verdict award was reduced from $3,705,000 to $2,100,000. This is a reduction of 43% and could
certainly be considered very significant.
The Court therefore reviewed other remittiturs and additurs to determine
what constitutes a “destruction” of the jury award in Tennessee. The Court found the following cases were
relevant to this issue:
[W]e find the
remittitur in this case is in line with other remittiturs which have been found
not to destroy the verdict See,
e.g. Jenkins v. Commodore Corp. S., 584 S.W.2d 773 (Tenn. 1979)
(40% reduction did not destroy the verdict); Johnson v. Nunis, 383 S.W.3d 122, 135 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012)
(43% reduction did not destroy the verdict); Palanki v. Vanderbilt University, 125 S.W.3d 380
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (59% reduction did not
destroy the verdict); Grandstaff, 36 S.W.3d 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)
(45% reduction did not destroy the verdict); Steel v. Ft. Sanders Anesthesia Group, P .C., 897
S.W.2d 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (40% reduction did not
destroy the verdict); Rey v. Hestle, 1992 WL 102231, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)
(60% reduction did not destroy the verdict). Compare Foster, 621 S.W.2d at 148
(additur thirty times that of the jury verdict destroyed the verdict); Meals, 417 S.W.3d at 423
(70.55% reduction destroyed the verdict); Lashlee v. Harper's Chrysler, No.
M2007–00443–COA–R3–CV, 2008 WL 3983120, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)
(95% reduction destroyed the verdict).
As a result, the
Court ultimately held that a 43% reduction in the award by remittitur did not
“destroy” the verdict and therefore did not violate this principle of law. Based upon a review of the cases cited in
this decision, it appears the line where a remittitur “destroys” the jury verdict
award is somewhere greater than 60%.
Remittiturs have been found acceptable in Tennessee within a range of
between 40% and 60%. Reductions of 70%
or greater have been found to destroy the jury verdict. So somewhere between 60% and 70% is the line
where a remittitur destroys the jury verdict and should be modified or vacated
by the Tennessee appellate court.
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