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Posted on Feb 22 2015 9:35PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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The Tennessee Court of Appeals decided a
recent interesting case involving a shooting that occurred just outside of the
property of a youth outreach ministry.
The Jerterrius Marshawn
Akridge v. Fathom, Inc., No. 2014-00711-COA-R9-CV, 2015 WL 97946 (Tenn. 2015) decision dealt with
a shooting that occurred close to, but clearly outside of the property of the
defendant. The plaintiffs alleged they
were attending a public music event at Club Fathom. Club Fathom provides outreach to at-risk
youth, including gang members. At the
event the plaintiffs assert certain individuals wore gang colors and an
altercation erupted inside the building.
The defendant’s security personnel forced all patrons to leave the
building and the premises. The
plaintiffs were subsequently caught in a shooting which occurred off the
premises.
The plaintiffs claimed the defendant had a
history of violence and numerous incidents of crime and public disorder on
their property. Further, the plaintiffs
claim the defendant had a duty to the plaintiffs as invitees to protect them
and to operate the club in a reasonably safe manner. Plaintiffs largely relied upon the seminal
case on this issue, McClung v. Delta
Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn. 1996) (this case discusses
the duty of a premises owner to protect their customers when there is knowledge
of crimes occurring on and around their property)
The question in the Akridge case
was whether the defendants owed any duty of care to the plaintiffs when they
were not on the defendant’s property at the time of the shooting. The court noted that generally there is no
duty to control the conduct of a third party to prevent harm unless:
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the
third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's
conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the
other which gives to the other a right to protection. Newton v. Tinsley,
970 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997) ...
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Posted on Feb 8 2015 11:37PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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The Tennessee Supreme Court in Brenda
Benz-Elliott v. Barrett Enterprises, LP, No. M2013-00270-SC-R11-CV, 2015 WL 294635
(Tenn. 2015) has provided an opinion that attempts to clarify how
statute of limitations should be applied for Tennessee cases. Over the years numerous Tennessee appellate decisions
have cited the “gravaman of the complaint” rule in order to determine which
statute of limitations applies to a case.
(Benz-Elliott
at 7, 8). In this case, the Tennessee
Supreme Court noted that defining exactly what this actually means has proven difficult
over time. If you desire to read a
detailed analysis of the historical citations to this rule and the general “fuzziness”
in the actual application of this rule, this case provides a lengthy discussion
of these issues. For the purposes of
this blog post, however, I am mainly going to address the ultimate conclusion
of the Tennessee Supreme Court that is an attempt to clarify confusing
pre-existing precedent.
Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Court
found that when choosing the appropriate statute of limitations for a case
“courts must ascertain the gravaman of each claim, not the gravaman of the
complaint in its entirety.” Benz-Elliott
at 8. The Court then found the
court’s should use a specific “two-step approach” test that has previously been
discussed in Tennessee decisions in order to determine the gravaman of a
claim. This holding is stated as
follows:
Today we clarify
that the two-step approach articulated in Vance and applied in Alexander and Harvest Corp.
is the correct framework for courts to employ when ascertaining the gravamen of
a claim for the purpose of choosing the applicable statute of limitations. When
utilizing this approach, a court must first consider the legal basis of the
claim and then consider the type of injuries for which damages are sought. This
analysis is necessarily fact-intensive and requires a careful examination of
the allegations of the complaint as to each claim for the types of injuries
asserted and damages sought. Contract
Law and Practice § 12:78, at 595 (2006).
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