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Posted on Aug 27 2017 10:58AM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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The Tennessee Court of
Appeals in Larry
Stine Bates v. Michael J. Greene, W2016-01868-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 3206599 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2017) dealt with an interesting issue involving the statute of
limitations that applies to the filing of a claim against an uninsured motorist
carrier. The uninsured motorist carrier
in this case was Shelter Insurance. The plaintiff filed suit against the
defendant, the alleged tortfeasor, within one year of the accident. However,
the civil warrant was returned unserved. An alias was then issued for the
defendant but it was also returned unserved. Over two years after the actual
accident, an amended alias civil warrant was issued against the defendant,
which added Shelter Insurance Company, plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier,
as a defendant. The uninsured motorist carrier was served over two years after
the accident occurred.
As a result, the
insurance company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and claimed that the
action against it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable
to personal injury actions. The circuit court agreed and granted the Motion for
Summary Judgment, dismissing the case against the uninsured motorist carrier.
The court found the one-year personal injury statute of limitations applied to
the uninsured motorist claim.
On appeal, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals reviewed the situation in detail. They reviewed a
significant amount of prior cases as well as statutory changes to the uninsured
motorist statute. Ultimately, the Court
concluded that in this case, the one-year statute of limitations for a personal
injury claim did not apply. Instead, the six-year statute of limitations for a
contract cause of action applied for the claim against the uninsured motorist
carrier. Multiple prior Tennessee cases
have held consistent with this opinion in the past. The Court also analyzed T.C.A.
§ 56 -7-1206(d) which provides the following:
(d) In the event that service of process against the uninsured motorist,
which was issued to the motorist's last known address, is returned by the
sheriff or other process server marked, “Not to be found in my county,” or
words to that effect, or if service of process is being made upon the secretary
of state for a nonresident uninsured motorist and the registered notice to the
last known address is returned without service on the uninsured motorist, the
service of process against the uninsured motorist carrier, pursuant to this
section, shall be sufficient for the court to require the insurer to proceed as
if it is the only defendant in the case.
Based on this statute
the Court noted that the legislator intended that a plaintiff could sue the
uninsured m...
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Posted on May 28 2017 4:02PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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As many in Tennessee
are aware, a few years ago the Tennessee Legislator passed T.C.A.
§ 55-8-132 which provides that when an individual passes a stationary emergency
vehicle on the side of the road, there are certain requirements to try to pull
over or slow down, depending on the road conditions. Previously, this applied only
to emergency vehicles that were using flashing light. The prior statutory language was as follows:
(a) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle making
use of audible and visual signals meeting the requirements of the applicable
laws of this state, or of a police vehicle properly and lawfully making use of an
audible signal only:
(1) The driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and
shall immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close as possible to,
the right-hand edge or curb of the roadway clear of any intersection, and shall
stop and remain in that position until the authorized emergency vehicle has
passed, except when otherwise directed by a police officer; and
(2) Upon the approach of an authorized emergency vehicle, as stated above
, the operator of every streetcar shall immediately stop the streetcar clear of
any intersection and keep it in that position until the authorized emergency
vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a police officer.
(b) Upon approaching a stationary authorized emergency vehicle, when the
vehicle is giving a signal by use of flashing lights, a person who drives an
approaching vehicle shall:
(1) Proceeding with due caution, yield the right-of-way by making a lane
change into a lane not adjacent to that of the authorized emergency vehicle, if
possible with due regard to safety and traffic conditions, if on a highway
having at least four (4) lanes with not less than two (2) lanes proceeding in
the same direction as the approaching vehicle; or
(2) Proceeding with due caution, reduce the speed of the vehicle,
maintaining a safe speed for road conditions, if changing lanes would be
impossible or unsafe.
However, the 2017
Tennessee Legislator expanded this law to now apply to any “stationary motor
vehicle”. This was done in Public Chapter
No. 95, signed into law by Governor Bill Haslam on April 4, 2017 and
effective on July 1, 2017.
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Posted on Jul 18 2015 3:50PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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The Tennessee legislature passed a new law
that provides protections for volunteer drivers in Tennessee. Specifically, Public Chapter No. 152
was signed into law by Governor Bill Haslam on April 16, 2015. This law is called the “Protection of
Volunteer – Insured Drivers of the Elderly (PROVIDE) Act.” This law can certainly have an impact on
certain automobile accident cases.
Specifically, this law provides that volunteer drivers who provide transportation
for senior citizens through a charitable organization or human service agency
cannot be found individually liable for any civil damages beyond the insurance
policy limits collectible for the accident.
This new law protects the at fault driver as
long as their fault consists of simple negligence. However, it is important to note that this
statute does not provide this limited immunity when the conduct of the
voluntary driver constitutes gross negligence, or willful and wanton
misconduct. Additionally, the human
services agency or charitable organization must maintain liability insurance
coverage at least equal to the minimum limits set forth in T.C.A.
§ 29-20-403 of the Tennessee
Governmental Tort Liability Act (which provides for minimum policy limits
of $300,000.00/$700,000.00).
This new statute takes effect for actions
that arise on or after July 1, 2015. The
entire statute provides as follows:
(a) As used in this section:
(1) "Charitable organization" means any charitable unit of a
religious or civic group exempt from taxation under 26 U.S.C. § 501, including
those supported wholly or partially by private donations;
(2) "Human service agency" means any human service unit, clinic,
senior citizens program, congregate meal center, or day care center for the
elderly, whether supported wholly or partially by public funds;
(3) "Volunteer" means an individual providing volunteer
transportation who may receive reimbursement for actual expenses or an
allowance to defray expenses of operating the vehicle used to provide
transportation services, but does not receive compensation for the person's
time; and
(4) "Volunteer tr...
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Posted on Jul 13 2014 7:03PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Analysis: The Tennessee Legislature dealt with an
interesting issue in the 2014 legislative session involving minor’s stuck in
vehicles. The legislature passed Public Chapter No. 788
and it took effect on July 1, 2014.
Apparently, there was some need to pass this statute although this statute
really addresses a very rare circumstance.
It is of note, however, that this particular change in Tennessee law has
received quite a bit of attention from the media even though there are other
changes in the law that are much more substantial and significant but they
receive no media attention.
In summary this new statute basically
provides immunity from civil liability for any damages resulting from forcible
entry into a vehicle to remove a minor from the vehicle. The person who removes the minor must have a
good faith belief that forcible entry is necessary because the minor is in
imminent danger of suffering harm. There
are also other requirements that are outlined in the statute and must be
followed for this immunity to apply. The
new statute is found in T.C.A.
§ 29-34-209 and provides as follows:
(a) A person whose conduct conforms to the requirements of subsection (b) shall be immune from civil liability for any damage resulting from the forcible entry of a motor vehicle for the purpose of removing a minor from the vehicle. (b) Subsection (a) applies if the person: (1) Determines the vehicle is locked or there is otherwise no reasonable method for the minor to exit the vehicle; (2) Has a good faith belief that forcible entry into the vehicle is necessary because the minor is in imminent danger of suffering harm if not immediately removed from the vehicle and, based upon the circumstances known to the person at the time, the belief is a reasonable one; (3) Has contacted either the local law enforcement agency, the fire department or the 911 operator prior to forcibly entering the vehicle; (4) Places a notice on the vehicle's windshield with the person's contact information, the reason the entry was made, the location of the minor and that the authorities have been notified; (5) Remains with the minor in a safe location, out of the elements but reasonably close to the vehicle until law enforcement, fire or other emergency responder arrives; and (6) Used no more force to enter the vehicle and remove the child from the vehicle than is necessary under the circumstances. (c) Nothing in this section shall affect the person's civil liability if the person attempts to render aid to the minor in addition to what is authorized by this section.
Obviously, it is likely
a rare circumstance where this will occur (I am referring to the actual need
for immunity to apply to protect someone from a lawsuit – I am aware
that minors are sometimes left in vehicl...
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Posted on Jul 6 2014 8:59PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Analysis: In the 2014 Tennessee Legislative session the
Tennessee Legislature decided to clarify exactly what constitutes a red light
violation in Tennessee. The legislature
amended T.C.A.
§ 55-8-110 which is the statute that discusses what traffic control signals
mean for an intersection. It defines and
explains the meaning of the “green”, “yellow”, and “red” notifications on
traffic signal devices. The Tennessee
Legislature passed Public
Chapter No. 989 that added a new subsection (e) to T.C.A. § 55-8-110 as
follows:
(e) It is not a violation of subdivision (a)(3), unless
the front tires of a vehicle cross the stop line after the signal is red.
Subsection (a)(3) is the section that
discusses the responsibilities of a driver when faced with a red light in
Tennessee. As a result of this change, it
is not a red light violation unless the front tires of the vehicle cross the stop
line after the signal is already red.
As a result, if the front tires are already beyond the traffic
intersection line at the point when the light turns red, then it is not a red
light violation under the newly amended T.C.A. § 55-8-110. This law takes effect on July 1, 2014.
Obviously, this change in the law will
come into play in automobile accident litigation across the state of
Tennessee. This new statute more clearly
defines what it means to violate a red light and provides a definitive time
period when a red light violation occurs (when the vehicle’s front tires cross
the intersection line when the light is already red). I am sure this statute will be heavily
involved in litigated car accident cases across the State of Tennessee. However, I think it is a beneficial
clarification in the law to make a bright line test for when a red light
violation occurs. There is still plenty of
room for disagreement as to whether the fr...
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Posted on Jan 28 2014 9:28AM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Analysis: The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently dealt
with the question of the responsibility of an individual who becomes unconscious,
while driving, causing an automobile accident.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals in George Smith v.
General Tire and Emily Alexander, No. M2012-01446-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 2395047 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2013)
involved a case where a man was injured in a head-on collision. The unconscious defendant in this case testified she did not remember
anything on the day of the accident from the point she came to a red light on
Gallatin Road until she woke up in an ambulance on the way to the
hospital. She had a long history of diabetes
but she had never experienced a loss of consciousness prior to the accident in
question. Additionally, she had never
been advised by her physician that she should not drive a vehicle. Her treating physician testified her blood
sugar level must have dropped too quickly for her to realize before she became
unconscious.
There was medical testimony submitted by
both sides pertaining to the possibility of her becoming unconscious based on the
medication and diagnosis of the defendant.
The Smith court found that
the Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted a rule that embodies how to deal with evaluating
the situation where a driver suddenly loses consciousness. This rule is as follows:
A sudden loss of
consciousness or physical capacity experienced while driving which is not
reasonably foreseeable is a defense to a negligence action. To constitute a
defense, defendant must establish that the sudden loss of consciousness or
physical capacity to control the vehicle was not reasonably foreseeable to a
prudent person. As a result, the defense is not avail...
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Posted on Nov 3 2013 4:25PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Analysis: I was recently asked
what Tennessee statutes govern whether horses are allowed on roadways and what “rules
of the road” would apply to horses or other animal drawn vehicles. Tennessee has a statute that cover this issue. T.C.A.
§ 55-8-105 provides that animals and animal drawn vehicles on the roadway
are basically subject to the same laws as all other vehicles on the road. They are granted the same rights as well as
the same duties that are provided to motor vehicles under Tennessee law.
T.C.A.
§ 55-8-105 provides as follows:
Every person
riding an animal or driving any animal-drawn vehicle upon a roadway shall be
granted all of the rights and shall be subject to all of the duties applicable
to the driver of a vehicle by this chapter and chapter 10, parts 1-5 of this
title, except those provisions of this chapter and chapter 10, parts 1-5 of
this title that by their very nature can have no application.
The only exception
listed in this statute where the rules of the road and duties applicable to
drivers of motor vehicles do not apply are where the statute by its very nature
could have no application. For example,
if there are specific statutes that discuss braking requirements or turn signals,
those would not apply to someone who is riding a horse under T.C.A.
§ 55-8-105.
Follow me on Twitter at @jasonalee
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Posted on Sep 30 2013 7:33AM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Brief
Summary: Tennessee emergency responders are not
required to follow certain traffic laws when responding to an emergency
call. However, they are still required
to drive with “due regard for the safety of all persons” and can still be held
liable if they do not comply with this requirement.
Analysis: A recent Tennessee Court of Appeals decision
discussed an interesting issue about whether emergency responders are required
to comply with traffic laws. The case of
Hardeman County v.
Judy I. McIntyre, 2013 WL 1227034, No. W2012-01690-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App.
2013)
involved a situation where an ambulance struck another vehicle while on an
emergency call. The ambulance crossed
the double lines in order to proceed around some vehicles but ended up striking
the plaintiff’s vehicle, injuring the plaintiff. The trial court assessed 60% of the fault
against the ambulance driver and 40% of the fault against the driver of the
other vehicle. The case was appealed and
the respective duties were discussed in detail.
The court noted that T.C.A. § 55-8-108 provides that
emergency responders are exempt from certain traffic laws in Tennessee. The key parts to T.C.A. § 55-8-108 are as follows:
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Posted on Jan 15 2013 10:52AM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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Brief Summary: The parental immunity doctrine does apply in Tennessee but was limited by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1994. The doctrine is limited to “conduct that constitutes the exercise of parental authority, the performance of parental supervision, and the provision of parental care and custody.”
Analysis: I recently received a question about whether a child can sue their parent for negligence in tort. Historically, the doctrine of “parental immunity” barred such a cause of action. This doctrine was first adopted by Tennessee Supreme Court in McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903). It was also reaffirmed as recently as 1985 by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Barranco v. Jackson, 690 S.W.2d 221 (Tenn. 1985). However, this doctrine was modified by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1994 in the case of Broadwell by Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1994).
In Broadwell, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted the trend at that time across America was to modify and limit the absolute parental immunity doctrine. As a result, the Court analyzed various modifications other states had enacted to the parental immunity doctrine (this is an interesting analysis if you are interested in this topic but it will not be restated here). Broadwell at 473 – 475. The Court also noted the reasons and justification for this doctrine as follow:
The parental right to govern the rearing of a child has been afforded protection under both the federal and state constitutions. This Court has stated, “Tennessee's historically strong protection of parental rights and the reasoning of federal constitutional cases convince us that parental rights constitute a fundamental liberty interest under Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution.” The integrity of the family unit has found protection against arbitrary state interference in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Posted on Aug 13 2012 10:24AM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
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The Tennessee legislature recently adopted Public Chapter No. 907 which was signed into law by Governor Bill Haslam on May 10, 2012. This bill amended T.C.A. § 55-8-164 to add a new subsection (e). This addition to the statute makes it a Class C misdemeanor in the State of Tennessee when an operator of a motorcycle carries a child whose feet are not on the footpegs of the motorcycle.
T.C.A. § 55-8-164 provides as follows (the section added by this amendment is in bold):
(a) A person operating a motorcycle shall ride only upon the permanent and regular seat attached thereto, and such operator shall not carry any other person, nor shall any other person ride on a motorcycle, unless the motorcycle is designed to carry more than one (1) person, in which event a passenger may ride upon the permanent and regular seat if designed for two (2) persons, or upon another seat firmly attached to the rear or side of the operator.
(b) A person shall ride upon a motorcycle only while sitting astride the seat, headlamp illuminated, facing forward, with one (1) leg on each side of the motorcycle.
(c) No person shall operate a motorcycle while carrying any package, bundle, or other article which prevents the person from keeping both hands on the handlebars.
(d) No operator shall carry any person, nor shall any person ride, in a position that will interfere with the operation or control of the motorcycle or the view of the operator.
(e)(1) An operator commits an offense who, on the streets of any municipality, roads of any county, or the highways of this state, carries a child as a passenger on a motorcycle whose feet are not on footpegs. Provided, the provisions of this subsection shall not apply to persons riding in a motorcycle sidecar.
(2)(A) A violation of this subsection is a Class C misdemeanor…
This amendment to the bill provides a potential basis for liability when an operator of a motorcycle carries a child who is not tall enough to reach the footpegs. In fact, this statute does not even limit the violation to circumstances where an individual is unable to reach the footpegs. Rather the motorcycle operator can be cited simply when the child’s feet are not on the footpegs. Thi...
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