|
Posted on Nov 25 2013 9:40AM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
|
Analysis: Tennessee has a statute that address whether
a parent can recover in a wrongful death cause of action when they have not
paid child support. Specifically, T.C.A. § 20-5-107 provides that a
parent cannot recover through a wrongful death action until all child support
obligations, along with interest, have been paid. T.C.A. §
20-5-107(b)
provides as follows:
(b) In no event
shall a parent be permitted to recover through an action commenced pursuant to
subsection (a) until all child support arrearages, together with interest on
the child support arrearages, at the legal rate of interest computed from the
date each payment was due, have been paid in full to the parent ordered to
receive the support or to the parent's estate if deceased.
Additionally, a parent who has
intentionally refused and neglected to pay child support for a two year period (or
for the life of the child if it is less) can be prevented from recovering under
the Tennessee wrongful death statute under certain circumstances. If this person was subject to a court order
requiring payment of child support and failed to do so and if they
intentionally refused or neglected to contact the child or exercise visitation
rights, then they are not permitted to recover for a wrongful death action in
Tennessee on behalf of their child.
Specifically, T.C.A. §
20-5-107(c)
provides as follows:
(c) Notwithstanding
any law to the contrary, a parent who has intentionally refused or neglected to
pay any support for a child for a two-year period, or for the life of the
child, whichever is less, when subject to a court order requiring the payment
of child support and who has intentionally refused or neglected to contact the
child or exercise visitation during such period, shall not be permitted to
recover through an action commenced pursuant to subsection (a) and § 20-5-106.
|
Continue
Reading
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Posted on Nov 18 2013 9:22AM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
|
Analysis: The Tennessee legal standard for a motion for
summary judgment has changed in the recent past. The Hannan v. Alltel
Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008) opinion by the Tennessee Supreme
Court modified the motion for summary judgment standard in October 2008. As of that time the court found that summary
judgment is only appropriate for a party if the evidence “(1) affirmatively
negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or (2) shows that
the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at
trial.” Hannan at 10. This Hannan standard made it
very difficult to obtain a motion for summary judgment in Tennessee.
As a result, the Tennessee legislature
passed T.C.A. § 20-16-101 which went into effect on July 1, 2011. This new motion for summary judgment standard
applies to all actions filed on or after July 1, 2011. In the text of Public Chapter 498 the legislature
specifically stated that, “Whereas this higher Hannan standard results
in fewer cases being resolved by summary judgment in state court, increasing
the litigation costs of litigants in Tennessee state courts and encouraging
forum shopping; and Whereas, the purpose of this legislation is to overrule the
summary judgment standard for parties who do not bear the burden of proof at
trial set forth in Hannan v. Alltel
Publishing Co.,
its progeny, and the cases relied on in Hannan.” As a result, the Tennessee legislature
established a new standard in T.C.A. § 20-16-101 which provides as follows:
In motions for summary judgment in any civil action in Tennessee, the
moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial shall prevail on
its motion for summary judgment if it:
|
Continue
Reading
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Posted on Nov 11 2013 10:18AM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
|
Analysis: Statutes of
limitations under Tennessee law are generally governed by Tennessee statute. A specific time period is outlined in the
statute within which a cause of action must be filed after a specific
event. However, there are certain
exceptions to the statute of limitations in Tennessee. One such exception is when the person
experiences “incapacity”. T.C.A. § 28-1-106 provides that if
an individual, at the time a cause of action accrues, is under 18 years of age
or is adjudicated incompetent then the statute of limitations is tolled (or put
on hold) under their “legal rights” are restored. For someone who is a minor, their “legal
rights” are restored at the age of 18. Their
18th birthday begins the time period for the original statute of
limitations for the cause of action. For
example, if a 15 year old minor is injured in an automobile accident, the one
year statute of limitations for the personal injury action begins to run on
their 18th birthday so they would have one year to file the cause of
action from the date of their 18th birthday. However, if the statute of limitations is
greater than three years then they are limited to only three years from the
date of their 18th birthday (the date of the restoration of their “legal
rights”).
For an individual who is adjudicated
incompetent at the time the cause of action accrued, the statute of limitations
begins to run from the date their “legal rights are restored” (that would be
the date they became competent again).
They can therefore commence the cause of action within the original statute
of limitations from the date their legal rights are restored. They also have the same three year cap for
any statute of limitations period that exceeds three years. T.C.A. § 28-1-106 in its entirety
provides as follows:
If the person
entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued,
either under eighteen (18) years of age, or adjudicated incompetent, such
person, or such person's representatives and privies, as the case may be, may
commence the action, after legal rights are restored, within the time of
limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceeds three (3)
years, and in that case within three (3) years from restoration of legal
rights.
|
Continue
Reading
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Posted on Nov 3 2013 4:25PM by Attorney, Jason A. Lee
|
Analysis: I was recently asked
what Tennessee statutes govern whether horses are allowed on roadways and what “rules
of the road” would apply to horses or other animal drawn vehicles. Tennessee has a statute that cover this issue. T.C.A.
§ 55-8-105 provides that animals and animal drawn vehicles on the roadway
are basically subject to the same laws as all other vehicles on the road. They are granted the same rights as well as
the same duties that are provided to motor vehicles under Tennessee law.
T.C.A.
§ 55-8-105 provides as follows:
Every person
riding an animal or driving any animal-drawn vehicle upon a roadway shall be
granted all of the rights and shall be subject to all of the duties applicable
to the driver of a vehicle by this chapter and chapter 10, parts 1-5 of this
title, except those provisions of this chapter and chapter 10, parts 1-5 of
this title that by their very nature can have no application.
The only exception
listed in this statute where the rules of the road and duties applicable to
drivers of motor vehicles do not apply are where the statute by its very nature
could have no application. For example,
if there are specific statutes that discuss braking requirements or turn signals,
those would not apply to someone who is riding a horse under T.C.A.
§ 55-8-105.
Follow me on Twitter at @jasonalee
|
Continue
Reading
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|